This article was solicited from the author on the editor in chief of Military Review following to a briefing the author not awayed to the Information Operations Symposium II held at Fort Leavenworth.

This article was solicited from the author on the editor in chief of Military Review following to a briefing the author not awayed to the Information Operations Symposium II held at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in succession 15 December 2005. The clause is an edited version of a transcript from that briefing. It includes additional material and clarification of facts and affairs provided by the author.

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business IN IRAQ has a way of debunking myths and countering Ivory Tower theories with hard facts in succession the ground. I admit that while I was preparing to attend in Iraq as a brigade commander, I was among the skeptics who doubted the value of integrating information operations (IO) into my universal of operations. Most of the officers forward my combat team shared my doubts about the relative importance of information operations. Of course, in general Army literature there is a great deal of discussion about IO theory. There is significantly les practical information, however, that details to what degree theory can be effectively translated into practice according to tactical units. My purpose in writing this article is to provide commanders the insights I gleaned from my experience.

shortly after taking command of my brigade, I quickly discovered that IO was going to be single of the two most vital tools (along with human intelligence) I would ne to be fortunate in a counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign. COIN operations meant competing daily to favorably influence the perceptions of the Iraqi population in our area of operations (AO). I quickly conclud that, without IO, I could not room for expectation to shape and set conditions for my battalions or my Soldiers to be successful

It certainly did not take prolonged to discover that the traditional tools in my military kit bag were insufficient to favorably compete in this new operational environment. As a brigade commander, I was somewhat surprised to find myself spending 70 percent of my time working and managing my intelligence and IO classifications and a relatively small amount of my time directly involved with the traditional maneuver and fire support activities. This was a paradigm shift for me The reality I stand over againsted was far different from what I had professionally prepared for through a lifetime of conventional training and experience.

Background

My brigade, the 2d Brigade Combat Team (BCT) was part of the 1st Armored Division. For the first 12 month in Iraq, we were task organized in Baghdad with up to eight battalions, roughly 5000 hale all trained for conventional combat. The BCT consisted of brace mechanized infantry battalions, a cavalry squadron, an armor battalion, a field artillery battalion, an engineer battalion, a support battalion, and a military police battalion. At headquarters were staff enablers like as psychological operations (PSYOP) and civil affairs (CA) detachments. At the same point, my task organization also included 12 U Army National Guard or make an exception of Component companies.

My brigade's AO cloaked roughly 400 square kilometers and encompassed 2 of the 9 major districts in Baghdad: Karkh and Karada. In those 2 heavily populated and congest districts lived between 700000 to a million citizens. The area contained at least 72 mahometan temples and churches.

In the northwest part of our AO, the population was predominantly Sunni. This area also contained a small neighborhood called Kaddamiya, where Saddam Hussein had grown up Not surprisingly, that community was a bastion of staunchly pro-Baath sentiment and was steadfastly loyal to Saddam. like demographic factors made that part of our AO particularly volatile and problematic.

In contrast, our area also contained the Karada district, undivided of the most affluent parts of the city. Three universities are located there, Baghdad University being at the real southeastern tip. Many Western-trained and educated elites live in Karada, and many of Baghdad's banks and headquarters for major businesses are there. The population in this area is characteristically more secular in its views and somewhat more receptive to outside ideas and influence. In addition, 70 percent of the embassies and diplomatic residences in Baghdad were situated in our AO (figure 1)

[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]

The southeastern region of our area was abode to a principally Shiite population. The infrastructure in this area was, in comparison to other parts of the city, shabby. In many places the population lived in almost uninhabitable conditions, the neighborhoods having been largely inattentioned by the Baathist regime for years (figure 2)

[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]

Another significant ingredient of this complex society was the Christian population. Baghdad has the largest Christian population in the fatherland and it was also concentrated inside our battlespace.

The demographic diversity in 2d Brigade's AO produc a fate of different ethnic, cultural, and religious dynamics. Consequently each area existinged unique IO challenges. And, of course, this already compound situation was made more entangled by insurgent and terrorist violence and the persistent lack of infrastructure and basic services.